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PRESIDENT'S NOTES 
In past issues of the Review I have 
focused remarks on various depart­
ments and centers of the Na val War 
College in an attempt to outline the 
manner in which they support the mis­
sion of the College. It is appropriate in 
this issue, in view of the June 1981 
Naval Command College Conference 
(NCCC 81) commemorating the 25th 
anniversary of the Naval Command 
College, to comment on the Naval Com­
mand College (NCC) and its impor­
tance within the rota! Naval War 
College organization. 
The mission of NCC, when estab­
lished in 1956, is still pertinent: to assist 
specially selected senior naval officers 
from other countries to prepare them­
selves for higher command responsibili­
ties in their own navies, and co familiar­
ize them with United Scates naval 
methods, practices, and doctrine. This 
mission does not vary in any meaningful 
sense from that of the parent War 
College. The enhancement of profes­
sional capabilities to make sound 
strategic, tactical, and managerial deci­
sions is a fundamental objective of each. 
The hisrorical development of the 
Naval War College and mission was 
most influential in the birth and subse­
quent evolvement of the Naval Com­
mand College. 
In the present period, the NCC sru­
dent body consists of approximately 35 
captains and commanders from other 
nations who have been selected to partici­
pate in the senior course of the Na val 
War College. Their academic regimen is 
virtually identical to that of the College 
of Naval Warfare, where they pursue 
the prescribed studies in Defense Econom­
ics and Decisionmaking, Strategy and 
Policy , and Naval Operations. They 
follow the same basic schedule and are 
integrated into the seminars and lec­
tures of their United States colleagues. 
There are some exceptions within the 
Naval Operations curriculum, where 
specific NCC seminars are conducted 
rhat are tailored more co the needs of 
the navies concerned and to satisfy 
security requirements. On an optional 
basis the NCC students may participate 
in the Electives Program. In addition, 
they participate in a preliminary orienta­
tion program that provides them with 
an introduction ro Naval War College 
facilities and programs, local customs, 
geography and institutions, the United 
Stares Government and Defense Depart­
ment organization. 
A significant part of the NCC educa­
tional process is rhe Information Pro­
gram. This program is directed and 
approved by the Chief of Naval Opera­
tions with the purpose of enhancing the 
professional  mil itary education 
received by our international friends by 
providing them a better understanding 
of American society, insricutions, and 
people. Inherent in the Information 4
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Of the several possible strategic options, thfr paper examines four: containment1 
dStente, regionalism, and isolationism. It includes a discuuion of national interesJJ 
and national IeC#rity objectiver and holds that these interests and objectives must be 
,pelted out for the Congreu, the agencies of government, and the people if a 
coherent and con;istent national strategy is to he achieved. 
OPTIONS FOR U.S. NATIONAL STRATEGY 
IN THE 1980s AND BEYOND 
by 
Colonel W.O. Staudenmeier, U.S. Army 
A significant indication of the future 
path of a nation's national strategy is its 
traditional pursuit of its national inter• 
ests, Walter Lippmann has written rhat: 
.. , the behavior of nations over a 
long period of time is the most 
reliable, though not the only index 
of rheir national interest. For 
though rheir interests are not 
eternal, they are remarkably persis­
tent. We can most nearly judge 
what a nation wiU probably wane 
by seeing what over a fairly long 
period of rime it has wamed: we 
can most nearly predict what it will 
do by knowing what it has usually 
done .... Even when they adapt 
themselves to a new situation, their 
new behavior is likely to be a 
modification rather than a transfor­
mation of their old behavior. 1 
Most modern nations have exhibited 
this phenomenon. For example, rhe 
central thrust of British security policy 
for centuries has been to provide for the 
security of the home islands. To this end, 
Great Britain has pursued national 
security policies that would insure thar 
its fleet was supreme in home waters, 
that no hostile power should occupy the 
Low Countries and that no hostile 
power or coalition should establish 
hegemony over the European conti­
nent.1 
Examination of the broad sweep of 
Russfan history also reveals a remark­
able consistency in its pattern of lasting 
national interests. Tsars and Com mis* 
sars alike have acted co facilitate conci� 
nental expansion. to exert pressure south­
ward and eastward in the search of 
warm water ports and ro give action m 
their belief chat Russia is destined to 
inherit the Jeadershipof Western dviliza� 
tion. 3 
The United States has passed through 
three p eriods of national srracegy. The 
first period-isolationism-began in 
1783 and lasted until the end of the 19th 
century, being reborn in 1919 after a 
shore hiatus in which Jmperialism was 
in vogue, and holding sway until the eve 
6
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A doctrine for the application of military power does not inhere in the mere 
pus session of-military power nnr is there universality of acceptance or application of 
such doctrine ar doer exist, The most elaborate conceptual fra1nework for 
considering the development and employment of military force is that of the Soviet 
Union. Our undemanding of that framework permit.r our hetter undemanding of 
their objective-means nexuJ' and that under.rtanding is essential to i-'Onsideration of 
our own objectives and 1neans, 
THE SOVIET CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR 
THE APPLICATION OF MILITARY POWER* 
by 
Phillip A. Petersen 
Soviet Military docrtfne consdmces 
that element of political strategy that 
concerns itself with those specific princi­
ples 1 methods, an<l forms of preparing 
for and waging war, 1 While the Soviets 
have made no secret of the continuing 
theoretical elaboration of their military 
doctrine, rhere is an apparent lack of 
Western appreciation of the effect of 
Soviet military doctrine and its compo­
nents upon practical problem solving. Ir 
is hoped that the following exposition 
will contribute to the eradicarion of chis 
liability by examining rhe integrated 
nature of Soviet war planning. 
Military Doctrine, Military doctrine 
is a highly developed discipline in the 
Soviet Union, and constitutes a sophisri� 
cared framework for the cxami nation of 
questions concerning military force 
employment and weapon systems devel­
opment (see Figure l), it is formulated 
at the highest levels of Soviet political 
and military leadership.1 Military doc� 
trine provides both the accepted view 
on the nnmre of furn re conflicts, as well 
as guid:ince for the military ro follow in 
preparing the armed forces for war. 3 
Thus, military doctrine is an expression 
of the political policy of the CPSU as 
reflected in the military policy of the 
Soviet Government or, as the Soviets 
put it, a directive of political strategy, It 
is distinguished from military science in 
char doctrine is a unified system of views 
*This artide consrltutes a continuation of
research that produced an earlier anide of the 
same title coauthored with Bruce A. Wallace 
which appemcd in the August 1980 i1>sut' of 
C:murtJ. pp, 15 -18. 18
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An examination of trade practice! indicater that European diuriminatory 
practices have had a slightly greater effect on U.S. trade than vice ver!a, and that 
government procurement practices in Europe will increasingly biar trade against the 
United State, if past trend, continNe. Thir paper di,cuue, the barrier, and market 
di;tortions that reitdct free trade of defense fioods between allies and offers 
suggestion, to improve the flow of defenre goods within an alliance. 
DISTORTIONS IN NATO DEFENSE TRADE 
by 
Major William C. Foster, U.S. Army 
Introduction, Estimates of military 
and economic efficlency gains have 
served as a catalyst to a general con­
sensuson both sides of the Atlantic that 
rarionalization, standardization and 
interoperability (RSI) is more than a 
worthwhile goal-it is a necessity. 1 A 
consensus has not been reached, how­
ever, on the appropriate paths to that 
goal. Many Europeans see standardiza­
tion as leading to greater dependence o n  
the United States for technologically 
advanced weapons systems. Oft-voiced 
concerns i n  the United States range 
from fears that efforts to improve the 
two-way street will lead to substantial 
qualitative and economic costs to the 
concern of industry that its market 
share and capabilities may decline, 
especially in light of suspected massive 
European support of its own armaments 
industry. This latter concern is illus­
trated by the testimony of the former 
President of Boeing, Oliver C. Boileau, 
when he stated to Congress "we cannot 
compete when a U.S. company/consor­
tium faces ... [a] foreignoompany/con• 
sortium whkh is supported or subsi­
dized by the home government. "2 Thus, 
despite the rhetoric that RSI is a military 
and economic necessity, the implementa­
tion of RSI has moved little from the 
point where, in Thomas Callaghan's 
words, the allies remain: 3 
-blocked from sharing the financial
burdens of weapons development, pro­
duction and support; 
-blocked from sharing research and
development costs of new energy 
sources and new methods of using 
energy more efficiently; 
-blocked from buying and selling to
the other the goods that each produces 
more efficiently; 
-blocked from providing jobs and
markers for their indusrrics on an inter# 
national scale. 
This essay examines the barriers and 
market distortions that restrict free 
trade of defense goods between the 29
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The conduct and outcome of a NATO conflict will be contin11ent on the security of 
the North Atlantic SLOCI and this security i, 11reatly dependent on who holds 
Norway. This analysir, drawin11 on lessons learned in World Warll, was prepared as 
part of the coune requirements of the Colle11e of Naval Command and Staff, Naval 
War Collef',e. 
SOVIET THREAT TO THE ATLANTIC SEA LINES 
OF COMMUNICATION: 
LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE GERMAN 
CAPTURE OF NORWAY IN I 940 
by 
Lieutenant Commander G.L. Underwood, U.S. Coast Guard 
The German Invasion and 
Capture of Norway. 
Bvents Prior to the Invasion. World 
War II began when che Germans 
invaded and capnired Poland inSepcem­
ber 1939. Within a few days, the Ger• 
mans unleashed their submarines 
against Allied shipping and the Barde of 
the Adantic was on. In October 1939 the 
British mined the Strait of Dover and 
the Germans were forced to send their 
ships and submarines through che 
North Sea and Norwegian Sea around 
rhe north of Scorland to reach the 
Atlantk, 
Shortly after the outbreak of the war, 
Norway, Sweden and !'inland declared 
neutrality. In November 1939 Russia 
atracked Finland. l'inland held out for 
3½ months, bur in l'ebruory 1940 the 
Russians massed 27 divisions against 
rhe Mannerheim Line and broke 
through. Finland surrendered on 13 
March l 940 and was compelled to cede 
some territory and bases to Russia. The 
Allies had made plans ro help !'inland 
by moving troops through Norway and 
Sweden. The plans were dropped when 
Norway and Sweden refused to cooper• 
ate and the troops were dispersed after 
Finland sued for peace. t 
Sweden's iron ore was essential to 
Germany's wanime industrial needs, Jr 
came to Germany via the Balric Sea and 
hy rail through northern Norway to 
Narvik and then by ship along rhe 
Norwegian coast and through the 
Danish Strait. 
The British atrempred m blockade 
Germany, denying them needed sup� 
plies and resources, but were reluctant 
to interfere in Norwegian territorial 
waters. However. in February 1940 the 
British gave clear indkarions to the 
Germans that they no longer inrended 
to respect Norway's neutrality when 46
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Brituin;s succesJjul Peninsula campaign against Napoleon was sustained through 
her seapower, Indeed, Britain 1s first offensive actions in the area were from the sea 
but1 almost forgotten and alwayJ' overshadowed by later events, these actions were 
prompted not by Napoleon 1s movements bl# by the existence of a Ruuian squadron 
lying in Urbon harbor and were directed toward the capture of that squadron. 
PORTUGAL AND THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN 
NAVAL CRISIS ( 1808) 
by 
Donald D. Horward 
During the Napoleonic period several 
critical decisions had a major influence 
on rhe future of the French Empire. 
Unquestionablyt one of the most cata� 
strophic decisions centered around 
Napoleon's efforts to subjugate Portugal 
and Spain. This in turn, forced Great 
Britian to commit its wealrh, man­
power, and ultimately irs future to the 
struggle for control of the Peninsula. ln 
the initial stages of rhis conflict, the 
Royal Navy became the cutting edge of 
Hritain's new offensive. Through a 
series of doseJy related circumstances 
the British Government was first drawn 
into the Peninsula by its attempts to 
capture a Russian squadron in Lisbon 
harbor, This was soon complicated by 
rhe Spanish and Portuguese insurrec­
tions against the French and Jed Britain 
to commit a land force chat was to carry 
on the struggle, with dose naval support, 
© 1981, Donald D. fforward. 
until Napoleon's abdkation in Aptil 
1814. 
The events that led ro Napoleon's 
involvement in Iberia were set in 
motion following the Treaty of Tilsir 
between Napoleon and Alexander I in 
July 1807. Russian naval operations in 
rhe Mediterranean Sea were haired 
against France and its satellites while 
Napoleon offered safe harbor and pro­
visions for any vessels of the Tsar's 
squadrons srill in the Mediterranean. 
When the Baltic Fleet commanded by 
Vice Adm. DlmitriSiniavin was ordered 
home from Corfu, the commander of 
the French Squadron at Cadiz, as well as 
the maririme prefects at Brest, Roche­
fort, and Lorient were alerted ro his 
possible arrival and ordered to fulfill his 
every reque.st. 1 
In early September the Russian Baltic 
squadron was instructed to sail from 
Corfu to Cadiz en route ro the Baltic 
although there was some concern that a 
British squadron mighr try to intercept 51
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Clientitm is ,een by rnme a! hegemony, an evil that includet any linkage of 
1upport for conceuion, This paper di1pute.r that view and argue; that we have not 
learned from experience nor have we con.;idered what le.; Ions our experience.r have 
taught other,; it argue, fora different method of ,electing friends and a different way 
to define the term, of ,upport we offer friend,. 
CLIENTISM UNBOUND: 
AMERICA AND THE TA CTI CS OF THIRD WORLD 
SECURITY 
by 
Robert King Morris 
Arr is stiU instructive. 
In a scene from David Lean's 
Lawrence of Arabia, the leader of the 
Arab Revolt confers with tribal chief­
tains and gazes into the great desert 
known as God's Anvil. Beyond the sands 
lies the Turkish garrison at Aqaba, their 
obje,tive} and Lawrence has just decided 
they will cross the desert and rake it. 
The sheikhs reproach him: for it is 
written that no man may walk God's 
Anvil and live, Nonetheless the once 
and future enigma who will one day 
write The Seven Pillarr of Wisdom 
looks a, them, sandy-eyed, and replies 
simp)y 1 "Nothing is written." 
His words ar e with us even now. 
Similarly might we judge, though not 
our of self-confidence hue self-conscious­
ness, any doctrine today that coJors our 
vision of America's role in the world. 
The Monroe and Truman Doctrines, 
our twin pillars of confidence only 30 
years ago, have almost been lost since 
then in the furious recycHng of our 
principles. Unfairly, these cycles began 
with che very doctrinaire John Foster 
Dulles. For the simple goal of contain­
ing communism. Dulles reinvoked 
collective security, creating ambitious 
treaty organizations as regional stop� 
gaps, America thence was not only 
committed to new allies but entangled 
in often age-old rivalries: in any Holy 
Alliance there was always to be a brush­
fire, a weakest link that would require us 
on a crisis-footing, ln this sense the 
Dulles legacy's denouement in Indo­
china was almost an afterthought, 
though for the home audience the 
Kennedy-Johnson rendition of contain­
ment floundered climacticatly on the 
screen. So, for thar matter, did the 
Nixon Doctrine-which hypothesized 
that America's allies shouldt with Ameri­
can arms, be able to fight their own 
78
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